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Abstract
Firms can motivate workers by offering them social status. Much of the literature
argues that a rise in status is a powerful work incentive while ignoring its impact on
coordination. However, when workers need to collaborate while having individual
vested interests, too large a difference in status distorts how workers coordinate,
i.e., one worker compromises too much with respect to his most preferred choice
and the other compromises too little. On the contrary, small status differentials
can be profitable when status confers power and cost advantages.
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Collaboration and teamwork play an important role in supporting business processes
within an organization.1 However, when vested interests are at work, firms often have
difficulty in coordinating their workers. Let us consider that the marketing department
anticipates new marketing channels through mobile computing and social networks and
that the IT department develops new technology to implement these ideas. The deci-
sions favored by the former may not be preferred by the latter: e.g., the IT department
favors sophisticated design while the marketing department prefers simplicity and user-
friendliness. So, if the two departments do not coordinate and as a result release a product
that consumers do not like, it will hurt the firm’s profits. To improve coordination, the
firm may hire a leader (e.g., through promoting one department head, the CIO or the
CMO, to CEO to oversee the firm’s departments), but this raises some concern over
status, which, in turn, affects the workers’ behavior.2 In particular, many sociological
studies have documented that status leads to power and cost advantages, which may
be tied to a better access to resources (among others, large and well-equipped offices,
private jets and chauffeur-driven cars, country club memberships). Interestingly, I show
that status differences do not necessarily increase profits when they confer power or when
they provide cost advantages. Yet, they can increase profits in the presence of both.
Moreover, status differences affect not only coordination but also the optimal organi-
zational structure. Some interesting questions are, e.g.: how does status affect the way
high-status workers coordinate with lower-status workers? And, under what conditions
1A survey of Accenture (2014) shows growing collaboration between IT and marketing departments
in recent years.
2Recent experimental studies find that higher-status individuals have a significant impact on lower-
status individuals, so that status can help solve coordination problems (Eckel and Wilson, 2007; Eckel
et al., 2010; Simpson et al., 2012).
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it is profitable for the firm to introduce status differentiation? Furthermore, how does
status affect the design of jobs on the career ladder and, in particular, should promotions
involve empowering the leader to take a very different or rather a similar role?
To answer these questions, I consider a firm with two workers. Each worker can
choose an action while preferring a different action. Each obtains half of the firm’s
output, which is maximized when both workers choose the same action.3 In other words,
the total output depends on how well the workers cooperate, which in turn depends
on how willing they are to compromise their preferred actions. The firm can choose
whether to promote one of the workers as the leader. In the absence of promotion, both
workers have an identical status, whereas in the case of promotion, the leader receives
a higher status than the other. The sociological and managerial literature shows that a
higher status often comes with a set of benefits: a high status worker might have a cost
advantage (Podolny, 1993)—for example, due to better access to resources (Belliveau
et al., 1996; Ibara and Andrews, 1993)—and/or more power (Castellucci and Piazza,
2013). In the same vein, Lucas and Baxter (2012) documented a number of reasons
for why status leads to power, e.g., high-status individuals are perceived to be more
competent and they hold more valuable resources than low-status individuals. Therefore,
I consider two consequences of status: First, introducing a status difference decreases
the perceived cost of “compromising”, i.e., deviating from one’s most preferred action,
of one worker but increases the perceived cost of the other worker, and such a perceived
cost is measured by the actual cost of compromising adjusted for status concerns. For
example, increasing status may reduce the leader’s perceived cost of compromising when
the leader has better access to resources, which makes his action choice more flexible
than the follower’s. However, increasing status may increase the leader’s perceived cost
3As shown Section 3.1, my results are driven by coordination issues rather than by the assumption
of interdependent payoffs.
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of compromising when the leader faces high opportunity costs in cooperating with his
teammate, such as the need to forgo time and resources spent on other activities, which
makes his action choice less flexible than the follower’s. Interestingly, my results are valid
whether the high-status or the low-status worker is more willing to compromise than his
teammate. The second effect of introducing a status difference is that it empowers the
leader to instruct the follower what action to take, which the follower chooses to obey or
not. If the follower disobeys, he incurs a cost, which is increasing in the leader’s status.
These two elements are discussed separately in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The objective of
the firm is to choose the organizational mode maximizing its profit, which is measured
by the difference between output and actual costs of the workers.
I show that introducing a status difference increases output but causes distortion to
the way workers coordinate: on the one hand, a status difference has a positive effect on
the organizational value as it lowers the average cost of compromising; on the other hand,
it has a negative effect as it may induce too much compromising effort from the worker
with the lower perceived cost, and too little from the worker with the higher perceived
cost. The negative effect is especially strong when there is a large status difference.
Because the organizational value depends on actual costs rather than perceived costs,4
unbalanced coordination efforts are not desirable from the firm’s point of view. As a
result, the firm benefits from introducing some but not too much status differentiation.
In the case where the leader does not have authority over the follower, it is to the firm’s
benefit only when a status difference is more effective in reducing a worker’s perceived cost
than in raising another worker’s cost (see Propositions 2). In the case where the leader
also has authority and he has a lower cost of compromising than the follower, status
4In Section 2, I provide some examples that explain why status differences affect workers’ perceived
costs, whereas the organizational value depends on workers’ actual costs. Footnote 15 also explains what
would happen if this assumption is dropped.
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differentiation is more likely to increase the firm’s profit compared to the case without
authority, because the leader has an additional instrument, which is the power to make
recommendations, to improve coordination (see Proposition 3). This implies that it can
be profitable for the firm to introduce status differences when status confers both power
and cost advantages. However, notice that the benefits of introducing a status difference
do not hinge on the fact that status creates more money for the firm by altering workers’
perceived costs, as shown in Section 3.2. In other words, high status does not serve as a
substitute for high wages, which makes this paper very different from the literature that
focuses on monetary incentives.
These results have interesting implications for the design of employees’ tasks in pro-
motions: if promotion involves changes in responsibilities, for example, from routine tasks
performed by junior workers to supervisory or more creative tasks performed by man-
agers, the firm may benefit from introducing more differential treatment between senior
and junior employees compared to the case where responsibilities remain the same on
the promotion ladder. This explains why, in practice, some workers receive longer va-
cation, a larger and better equipped office, and other luxurious perks owing to seniority
in a company; and sometimes the more so when the roles of the leaders change upon
promotion.
1.1 Related Literature
The importance of status for explaining behavior has long been recognized (Veblen, 1934;
Frank, 1985). However, the literature focuses largely on monetary incentives. For in-
stance, Frank (1984) empirically shows that workers care about their relative ranking in
a company. In particular, workers at the top are willing to accept a remuneration that
is below than their productivity for being at the top (see also Lazear and Rosen, 1981;
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Lazear, 1989; Lazear, 1991). In contrast to the literature, this paper focuses on non-
monetary sources of status.5 Postlewaite (1998) compares different approaches to model
status: people either value status itself or seek status for another purpose. I follow the
latter approach, in which status changes worker’s perceived costs and confers authority.6
In the case of lower perceived costs, status differential may come from a worker’s access
to nonmonetary privileges; for example, having larger networks of contacts makes action
choices more flexible, which lowers the worker’s cost of compromising. In the case of
higher authority, the leader’s power to make recommendations creates status differential.
Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature by considering the effect of status
on coordination. Essentially, the literature focuses either on the work motivation effect of
status or on the signaling effect of status. On work motivation, theories in the tournament
literature show that when agents care about their relative ranking in organizations, sta-
tus can be used to provide work incentives (Moldovanu et al., 2007; Auriol and Renault,
2008; Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2010). Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) further distinguish
the effect of inequality of rewards and endowments on incentives, and show that differ-
ent types of inequality have opposite effects. However, the tournament literature treats
agents separately while this paper provides a model that explains the effect of status on
coordination by allowing agents to work in teams. On signaling, the literature shows that
status can generally improve the matching of workers and firms (Fershtman, Hvide, and
Weiss, 2006; Truyts, 2010). Since matching is positively assortative, i.e., the best job is
allocated to the most successful candidate, workers will care about their relative position
in the population. But again, the element of coordination is missing.
5This seems more realistic because plenty of evidence shows that relative concerns, not only in terms
of income, but also in terms of property and cars matter for human behavior—as noted by Hirsch (1976).
6This paper differs from the literature on equality concerns in teams (see, e.g., Gill and Stone, 2015)
in that workers in this model do not have a preference for equality.
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Finally, this paper is related to the literature on internal organization of firms, which
studies coordination vs. specialization. See, for example, Hart and Moore (2005), Dessein
and Santos (2006), and Alonso et al. (2008), although they do not consider status. For
surveys on promotions, see Gibbons and Waldman (1999), Waldman (2013), and Lazear
and Oyer (2013). Also see Fama (1980), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), and Holmstro¨m
(1999), who provide models that explain how the prospect of promotion creates incentives
yet do not focus on coordination. In summary, standard models on status and promotions
capture work incentives but lack coordination between workers; standard models on inter-
nal organization allow coordination but lack status. This paper explores the interaction
between these interesting features, which so far the literature has largely ignored.
2 Model
Consider an organization with two workers, 1 and 2, who take actions a ∈ [0, 1] and
b ∈ [0, 1] respectively. The success of the organization depends on the coordination
between the two workers: the firm obtains a value of one with probability 1 − (a − b)2,
which is maximized when a = b.7 The revenue is shared equally between the two workers.8
Let s denote the worker’s status. Status is valued in relative terms: if worker 1 has
status s, then worker 2 has status −s. Assume without loss of generality that s ≥ 0.
Status affects the cost of action for the workers in two ways. First, there is a cost
7Note that as in the literature on coordination and adaption, such as Dessein and Santos (2006) and
Alonso et al. (2008), it is standard to model coordination in this way. Note also that although the
value of the action does not affect the gross revenue, it affects the net profit, as discussed in the socially
optimal case below.
8For example, revenue-sharing schemes are commonly used in partnerships, joint ventures, and co-
operatives. Moreover, a change in bargaining power further from one-half does not affect the results
qualitatively, as does the introduction of wages (see Section 3.3). Thus, for expositional simplicity, I
focus on equal shares.
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of “compromising”, i.e., deviating from one’s most preferred action. More specifically,
worker 1 bears a cost of f(s)(1− a)2 for taking action a, whereas worker 2 bears f(−s)b2
for taking action b, which can be interpreted as follows.9 The cost-minimizing action is
a = 1 for worker 1, and b = 0 for worker 2, meaning each worker has a vested interest.
Thus, 1 − a and b can be seen as a compromise that each worker makes in order to
coordinate with one another. Assume also f(0) = 1, so that when there is no status
differential, both workers’ marginal cost of compromising is the same. Notice that the
analysis does not rely on the assumption of f(·) being decreasing or increasing, which
means that the high-status worker may have lower or higher cost of compromising than
the low-status worker. For instance, the former could be more reasonable in a situation
where introducing a status difference gives the leader better access to resources, which
allows him to adopt more flexible action choices, and thus the cost of compromising for
the high-status worker is lower than that for the low-status worker. However, the latter
could be more reasonable in a situation where the opportunity cost of time and other
resources that the high-status worker need to spend on cooperating with his teammate is
high. Thus, the cost of compromising for the high-status worker is higher than that for
the low-status worker. In any case, what matters for the results is not the sign of f ′(·),
but the ranking of the marginal effect of status on the high-status worker versus that on
the low-status worker.
Second, status may empower the leader (worker 1) to get his way by making a rec-
ommendation to the follower (worker 2), and the follower incurs a disobedience cost if
he does not follow the recommendation. More specifically, suppose worker 1 makes a
recommendation bl to worker 2.
10 Since worker 2 has effective control over action b, he
9The assumption that status is complementary with costs is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2,
but it is essentially a common assumption in the literature (see, for instance, Hopkins and Kornienko,
2004; Auriol and Renault, 2008).
10My results do not rely on which worker is making the recommendation, as there are no restrictions
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can choose whether and to what extent to follow the recommendation. However, if he
decides to disobey worker 1, he incurs an additional cost of g(s)(b− bl)2.11 For simplicity,
assume that g(s) = s, so the lower the worker’s status, the higher the cost of disobeying.12
Notice also that g(0) = 0, so that the cost of disobeying is zero when there is no status
differential, that is, s = 0.
Thus, the costs of workers 1 and 2, denoted c1(s, a) and c2(s, b) respectively, are given
by
c1(s, a) = f(s)(1− a)2,
and
c2(s, b) = f(−s)b2 + s(b− bl)2.
I do not consider monetary transfers, but focus instead on nonmonetary sources of
status, which is an interesting issue because nonmonetary incentives are widely used in
practice.13 The value of the organization is defined by the total value created minus the
total costs:
V = 1− (a− b)2 − (1− a)2 − b2. (1)
Notice that V depends on the actual cost of taking actions and not on the perceived cost
imposed on the sign of f ′.
11We can reinterpret g(s)(b− bl)2 in a moral hazard framework, where b is an unobservable action, bl
is an order from a superior worker, and g(s) is a probability of monitoring. However, this paper focuses
on how status affects coordination, which is an issue that is not discussed in the moral hazard literature.
12For example, guilt is one form of emotional distress that can be associated with the failure to act in
a way desired by others, and frequently arises in interpersonal relationships, as found by Baumeister et
al. (1994).
13For example, “cafeteria plans”, under which workers may receive different benefit packages in terms
of day offs, access to company cars, office space and IT equipment, priority in choosing different things,
etc., exist in Belgium. The implementation of these is currently under discussion. See “Cafeteria
plans—other personnel solutions,” KPMG, September 19 2012, available at http://www.kpmg.com/
be/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/pages/cafeteria-plans.aspx.
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of workers that is modified by f(s).14 This is because the firm, contrary to the worker,
only perceives profit in monetary terms and does not consider the psychological or other
material benefits conferring status. For example, priority access to resources can decrease
the waiting cost of the leader and increase the waiting cost of the follower, but these time
costs do not matter for the firm as the total amount of resources demanded by the leader
and the follower is the same with and without status.15
To begin, consider the situation where one agent chooses both actions a and b, which
corresponds to the social optimum. Since there is only one agent, there is no concern for
status and f(0) = 1. The agent solves
max
a,b
(1− (a− b)2)− (1− a)2 − b2,








Then the level of compromise is given by 1− a∗FB = b∗FB = 1/3.
2.1 Identical Status
When two workers work together as a “team”, they have identical status (i.e., there is no
cost advantage and no authority). Then we have f(0) = 1. Worker 1 chooses his action





(1− (a− b)2)− (1− a)2.
14In sociology, status is defined as a subjective judgment of ranking pertaining to individuals or groups.
See Goldhamer and Shils (1939) and Podolny (1993).
15Nonetheless, it is straightforward to incorporate workers’ perceived costs in V . As s becomes very
large f(·) tends to zero, the firm can always achieve perfect coordination at a very small cost, making
status differentiation always desirable from the firm’s point of view. However, this seems somewhat
implausible as extreme status differentiation is rarely adopted in reality.
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(1− (a− b)2)− b2.








which yields a payoff of 5/16 for each worker, and 5/8 for the team. The level of compro-
mise is given by 1 − a∗team = b∗team = 1/4.16 The NE exhibits less coordination than the
social optimum because each worker obtains only half of the benefits from coordination.
2.2 Differentiated Status without Authority
Suppose now that worker 1 is promoted to be the leader and enjoys a higher status s.
Such a promotion changes his cost of compromising to f(s)(1 − a)2, and whether this
change in cost is a decrease or an increase depends on the sign of f ′. Similarly for the
follower: worker 2’s cost of compromising changes to f(−s)b2. Consider first the case
in which the leader does not have authority, i.e., he cannot make any recommendation
to the follower and bl plays no role. The case with authority is discussed in Section 2.3.





(1− (a− b)2)− f(s)(1− a)2,





(1− (a− b)2)− f(−s)b2.
16Note that although compromises are substitutes (that is, ∂(1− a)/∂b = ∂b/∂(1− a) < 0), they are
less substitutable in the NE than at the social optimum, which means that these partial derivatives are
less negative in the NE. Note also that a and b being substitutable might be thought of as a free-riding
problem: workers can free ride on each other’s contributions, and thus |a∗team − a∗FB | = |b∗team − b∗FB | =
1/12. The emphasis of a free-riding problem, however, is on actions a and b alone, but not on the
difference between them (i.e., the level of coordination), which is the focus here. Therefore, it cannot
study the effect of status on coordination, not to mention the effect of recommendations in Section 2.3.
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[f(s) + f(−s) + 2f(s)f(−s)](1 + 2f(s)) ,
b∗ =
f(s)
f(s) + f(−s) + 2f(s)f(−s) .
Clearly, the effect of status on the value of the organization depends on the shape of
f(s). However, when status affects the cost of compromising in a symmetric way, we can
show that
Proposition 1. Without authority, when status has a symmetric effect on high- and
low-status workers (that is, f(0)− f(s) = f(−s)− f(0)), for any s, it always reduces the
value of the organization, V .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that if the benefit of increasing a worker’s status equals the cost of
decreasing another worker’s status, then it is desirable for the firm to give equal treatment
to its workers. This is because lower status increases the follower’s cost (in the case of
f ′ < 0), which discourages him from cooperating with the leader—in other words, he is
less willing to compromise. However, due to the symmetric effects of status, the positive
effect that status has on the leader is not enough to offset the negative effect that it
has on the follower. However, notice that this result does not depend on whether it is
more costly for the high-status worker to compromise (that is, f ′ < 0) or the low-status
worker to compromise (that is, f ′ > 0). As long as the effect of status on these costs of
compromising is symmetric, any status difference leads to a lower organizational value.
Although status difference lowers the value of the organization, this does not mean
that status difference hurts coordination. In fact,
Corollary 1. For any s, status difference improves coordination, that is, ∂(a∗ − b∗)/∂s <
0.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus, even with symmetric effects, status difference improves coordination. This is
because the worker with the lower cost of compromising is more willing to coordinate.
However, this is also precisely why status difference may hurt the organization, because
most coordination efforts are now provided by the high-status worker, and such a situation
is not desirable for the firm. Recall that a∗FB = 2/3 and b
∗
FB = 1/3 at the social optimum.
Thus, the firm prefers more balanced coordination efforts.
Apart from the symmetric case, we can also show that in the neighborhood of s = 0,
Proposition 2. Without authority, introducing a small status differential increases the
value of the organization, V , compared to the case of identical status if
f ′(0+) < f ′(0−). (2)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The condition in Proposition 2 provides a simple rule to evaluate whether a firm
should differentiate status among workers, i.e., when status differential decreases the
leader’s cost more than it increases the follower’s (in the case of f ′ < 0). For example, if
an executive, who receives benefits afforded by status (e.g. business class travel, a larger
and better equipped office, and access to certain memberships or events), generates more
benefit through successful business deals, which outweighs the losses generated from a
junior employee who does not receive these benefits, then it is profitable for the firm to
raise the status of senior management. Notice that this result, similar to Proposition
1, does not depend on the sign of f ′. As long as status is more effective in reducing a
worker’s cost of compromising than in raising another worker’s cost (i.e., when Equation
(2) is satisfied), status difference increases the organizational value.
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These results are complementary to standard status models in the literature; there
usually assume that f(s) is continuously differentiable at zero, meaning that f ′(0+) =
f ′(0−) (see, for instance, Hopkins and Kornienko 2004; 2010).17 Indeed, when the effect
of status is symmetric, I show that firms have no incentive to introduce status differential.
This result changes when the effect of status becomes asymmetric between workers; hence,
this model offers an alternative reason for introducing status differentials that has not
been examined in the literature.
2.3 Authority
Next, we consider status differences that lead not only to a change in costs but also more
authority. While the allocation of authority has been studied in the literature on organi-
zations (see, for instance, Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Van den Steen, 2010), coordination
between agents has not. Unlike these standard models, this paper emphasizes how status
and authority affect coordination.
Suppose that worker 1 is the leader. He decides on action a, and now he also makes
a recommendation bl to worker 2. Introducing status has two effects: First, as before,
the leader’s cost of compromising is changed to f(s)(1− a)2, while the follower’s cost is
changed to f(−s)b2. Second, the follower chooses action b taking into account whether
and to what extent to obey the leader’s recommendation. In case of b 6= bl, there is a cost
of disobedience given by s(b− bl)2. This implies that authority creates status differential:
the more powerful the leader, the higher the cost of disobedience. For the moment, I
do not restrict the value of bl. In Corollary 2, I show that the qualitative result holds
even when bl ∈ [0, 1], i.e., when the leader has to make a middle-ground recommendation
17In terms of monetary incentives, Dye (1984) and Lazear (1989) show that wage differentials not
only provide incentives for productive behavior but also create incentives for sabotage. Yet, they do not
consider the interaction between status and coordination, which is the focus of this paper.
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between his own preferred choice and the follower’s.




(1− (a− b)2)− f(s)(1− a)2,




(1− (a− b)2)− f(−s)b2 − s(b− bl)2.
Thus, given the recommendation made by the leader, bl, there is an equilibrium in
the second stage where the two workers choose their actions such that
a∗(bl) ∈ arg max
a
pil,
b∗(bl) ∈ arg max
b
pif .
Let U denote the value of the outside option for worker 2.18 The leader’s maximization




∗(bl), b∗(bl)) ≥ U. (4)
Parallel to Proposition 2, by focusing on a small status difference, we have the follow-
ing result:
Proposition 3. With authority, introducing a small status differential increases the value
of the organization, V , compared to the case of identical status if
(f ′(0+)− f ′(0−))2 < f ′(0−)− 2f ′(0+). (5)
18Note that the qualitative result does not depend on the value of the outside option (see Appendix
F). However, it is important to take into account the follower’s participation constraint in the case with
authority; otherwise, the leader can always ask the follower to make all the compromises by recommending
a = b = 1, which leaves the follower a negative payoff. In the case without authority, however, there
is a unique equilibrium. So, as long as the outside option is relatively small compared to the case with
identical status (that is, 5/16), both workers will participate.
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Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 3 shows that the firm benefits from status differentiation with authority
when Equation (5) is satisfied. The crucial difference between Equation (2) and Equation
(5) is as follows. Suppose that the high-status worker is more willing to compromise
(that is, f ′ < 0). Then, authority makes it more likely that a status difference raises the
organizational value. For example, it is clear that when status differential has a symmetric
effect on high- and low-status workers, that is, f ′(0+) = f ′(0−), Equation (5) is always
satisfied, but never for Equation (2). The reason is that with authority, the leader can
compromise less by making a recommendation, which induces the follower to compromise
more. Thus, the negative effect of status, which arises because the high-status worker
compromises too much and the low-status worker compromises too little, is mitigated,
and this increases the organizational value.
However, if the low-status worker is more willing to compromise (that is, f ′ > 0),
Equation (5) becomes more stringent than Equation (2), which implies that authority
makes it more likely that a status difference reduces the organizational value. The intu-
ition is that the follower tends to compromise more than the leader in this case because
the low-status worker has a lower cost of compromising. With authority, the leader can
induce the follower to compromise even more than when there is no authority, which
further distorts how workers coordinate and reduces the organizational value. This, in
turn, implies that it is more profitable for the firm to introduce status differences when
authority is delegated to the worker who has a lower cost of compromising.
Furthermore, these results have interesting implications for the design of employees’
tasks on the promotion ladder. The case of status differentiation without authority can
be interpreted as the firm introduces status differentiation by promoting a worker to
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be the leader without changing his job duty, which means that he is responsible for
the same task (that is, task a) before and after promotion. For example, in academia,
the main responsibility of professors is to teach and to do research, whether they are
promoted or not; the same holds for healthcare and other specialized professions.19 The
case of status differentiation with authority can be interpreted as changing the leader’s
responsibilities upon promotion, for example, while he performs task a before promotion,
he is responsible for both tasks a and b after promotion. This is applicable to many private
and public sectors where managers perform a very different role from junior workers. The
result then implies that if promotion involves job changes and authority is delegated to
the worker who has a lower cost of compromising, it does not hurt to increase status
differentiation among workers compared to the case when promotions do not involve a
change in responsibilities.
Suppose now that the leader is constrained in making his recommendation such that
bl ∈ [0, 1]. This constraint matters only when the leader recommends bl > 1 in the
unconstrained case as discussed in Proposition 3. We can show that
Corollary 2. If U = 5/16 and −1/8 ≤ f ′(0−)−3f ′(0+) ≤ 21, then bl ≤ 1 is not binding,
and introducing a small status differential increases the value of the organization, V ,
compared to the case of identical status when Equation 5 holds. However, if U < 5/16, or
when U = 5/16 and f ′(0−)− 3f ′(0+) > 21, then the constraint is binding, implying that
bl = 1, and introducing a small status differential increases the value of the organization
if
f ′(0+) < f ′(0−) + 3. (6)
19Although Auriol and Renault (2008) also discuss incentives and promotions, promotions in their
model do not involve job changes.
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Proof. See Appendix E.
This implies that when the leader is constrained in making his recommendations, it
is more likely that authority increases the value of the organization, i.e., Equation (6)
is less stringent than Equation (2). The reason is that when the leader is constrained,
he can induce less compromising effort from the follower compared to when he is not
constrained, and this is desirable from the firm’s point of view, as the firm prefers more
balanced coordination efforts. Notice also that when the follower’s outside option is
low enough (that is, U < 5/16, where 5/16 is the follower’s payoff when s = 0), the
constraint is always binding and bl = 1. This means that when the follower’s outside
option is relatively low, the leader has incentives to recommend actions that are very
different from the follower’s preferred action, so as to induce more compromising effort
from the follower.
Proposition 3 is derived for small status differentials (that is, s→ 0), and it is robust
to variation in the functional form of f(s). However, for large status differentials, the
impact on a firm’s profits depends on the functional form of f(s) and, in particular, the





if s ≥ 0
2− 1
1−s if s < 0.
We can then show that
Proposition 4. With authority, large status differentiation reduces the value of the or-
ganization, V .
Proof. See Appendix F.
When large status differentiation is introduced, the low-status worker becomes very
unhappy (since f ′ < 0 in this example) and a large distortion in the leader’s action
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Figure 1: Identical vs. Differentiated Status.
with respect to the socially optimal level is needed in order to induce the follower to
participate. In particular, the larger the status differential, the lower the leader’s cost,
and the more willing he is to distort his action in order to compensate the disutility of
the follower arising from lower status. As a consequence, it is not optimal to differentiate
status among workers when such a loss from distortion more than offsets the gain in
improved coordination.20 In other examples where f ′ > 0, the intuition is similar, with
the only difference that the high-status worker becomes unhappy in this case, and thus
a status difference is desirable when the benefit of improved coordination outweighs the
cost of distorting the action of the low-status worker.
Figure 1 illustrates Propositions 3 and 4. It compares the value of the organization
20Note that, as shown in Corollary 1, although a very large status difference would seem to generate
“perfect” coordination (that is, a − b = 0), this is not the most desirable way of coordination from the
firm’s point of view.
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with status differentials (shown as the solid line) and that without status differential
(shown as the dotted line). The figure illustrates that it is profitable for the firm to
introduce some—but not too much—status differentiation.
This result extends the literature on status as follows. The basic result of this liter-
ature is that workers are willing to work hard to improve their status in organizations,
and therefore status generates work incentives (see, e.g., Moldovanu et al., 2007; Auriol
and Renault, 2008; Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2010). However, agents in these models do
not differ in their favorite choice of action. In fact, differences of opinion between individ-
ual workers and departments within a firm on production—ranging from product design
to input sourcing, manufacturing and delivery of the final product—are very common.
When vested interests are at work, I show that too large a difference of status distorts
how workers coordinate. This result highlights the cost of status, which must be traded
off against the benefit of raising work incentives emphasized in the literature.
3 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the importance of coordination, the assumption of complemen-
tarity, and the consequence of introducing wages.
3.1 The importance of coordination
To better understand the results (i.e., how status affects the organizational value through
its impact on coordination), consider two slightly different settings, where there is no
need for coordination. The first concerns independent production with interdependent
payoffs: each worker still gets half of the team’s output, which is now redefined as the
sum of workers’ compromise (that is, 1− a+ b), so that there are no coordination issues.
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(1− a+ b)− f(s)(1− a)2,
which leads to
1− aˆ = 1
4f(s)
,










Then it is easy to see that the value of the organization, defined as V = (1 − a + b) −











When status has symmetric effects on workers’ costs of compromising (that is, f(s) +
f(−s) = 2), we can show that V (s) > V (0) if x ∈ (0,√3/3), where 2x = |f(s)− f(−s)|.
Recall that in Proposition 1, when there is a need for coordination, a status difference
always reduces the organizational value with symmetric effects. In both cases, status has
two effects. First, it increases the total compromise level, since both 1−a∗+b∗ (in the case
with coordination) and 1−aˆ+ bˆ (in the case without coordination) are increasing in status
differences. Second, status distorts how workers coordinate: while the firm prefers more
balanced coordination efforts from its workers, status differences lead the worker, who
has a lower cost of compromising, to compromise too much. We can show that the latter







. However, the former is weaker when






result therefore highlights that the need for coordination creates some substitutability
21
between workers’ compromise, which leads status differences to reduce the organizational
value (the negative effect of status).
Alternatively, we can consider independent production with independent payoffs: each
worker chooses an effort level e, which generates payoff e at a cost f(s)e2. Thus, when







where e+ and e− are the efforts of the high-status worker and the low-status worker


















. Then we can easily show that h(t) is maximized at t = 1 for all
t ≥ 0, which implies that the value of the organization is maximized at s = 0 and any
status difference reduces the organizational value. Since some status differences may be
desirable in the case with coordination, this result highlights the role of status in raising
the organizational value via its impact on coordination (the positive effect of status).
In sum, in a model with interdependent production and interdependent payoffs, a
status difference that helps improve coordination (as measured by a− b) may also distort
how workers coordinate (the choice of action with respect to the social optimum).
3.2 Does status create or destroy money?
The literature frequently assumes complementarity between status and costs, but this can
result in status “creating” or “destroying” money for the firm depending on the precise
effect of status on cost, that is, f(s) here. More specifically, creating money means that
workers are better off by simply gaining a high status label. Thus, by introducing status,
the firm can pay workers less without losing them. However, in this case, the result that
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it is profitable for the firm to introduce status will not be interesting because it is driven
by the fact that status creates extra money for the firm. In what follows, I show that
in this model, a small status differential increases the value of the organization and at
the same time destroys money, so that my results are not driven by the assumption of
complementarity.
Let C denote the total costs of compromising for the workers:
C = f(s)(1− a)2 + f(−s)b2.
Status destroys money when evaluated at s = 0 if the total costs for the workers are




which is satisfied if
1
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)|s=0 > 0. (7)
If the impact of status on cost is symmetric between workers, then the first term on
the left-hand side is zero and Equation (7) is reduced to Equation (5), see Appendix D for
details. This implies that a small status differential increases the value of the organization
and at the same time destroys money. Even if the impact of status is asymmetric (e.g.,
when f ′(0+) − f ′(0−) > 0), the result in Proposition 3 remains valid provided Equation
(5) is satisfied.
3.3 Wages
Instead of sharing the revenue equally, one can allow for a more general setting where
a firm or a manager hires two workers, 1 and 2, and pays w1 proportion of the revenue
to worker 1 and w2 of the revenue to worker 2, where these wages can be different from
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one-half, but w1 + w2 ≤ 1. Then worker 1’s problem becomes
max
a
w1(1− (a− b)2)− f(s)(1− a)2,
and that of worker 2 becomes
max
b
w2(1− (a− b)2)− f(−s)b2.
The equilibrium actions are given by
a∗ =
f(s)(f(−s) + w2)
f(s)f(−s) + w1f(−s) + w2f(s) ,
b∗ =
f(s)w2
f(s)f(−s) + w1f(−s) + w2f(s) .
Then the manager gets
piF = (1− w1 − w2)(1− (a(w1, w2)− b(w1, w2))2).











For small status differentials (that is, s→ 0), this condition simplifies to
w1f
′(0+) < w2f ′(0−),
which is equivalent to Equation (2) if w1 = w2. Thus, with wages, instead of compar-
ing the marginal effect of status on workers’ costs of compromising, this new condition
compares the wage-adjusted marginal effect of status.
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4 Conclusion
While the literature typically focuses on how status concerns, at the micro level, affect
work incentives within organizations, and at the macro level, the quality of matches be-
tween firms and workers and the determination of equilibrium wage, this paper addresses
their impact on the organizational value when coordination is important. In particular, I
show that it is profitable for firms to introduce status differentiation when status affects
workers in an asymmetric way and/or when status confers authority. This implies that
status differentiation can be more beneficial to a firm when promotion involves a change
in job duties than when it does not.
There are several directions in which this analysis can be extended. First, one may
want to endogenize s. In this model, status is related to the cost of action, which is
exogenously determined, but I can easily show that the optimal s∗ is at some intermediate
value (see Figure 1). It would be equally interesting to correlate status with workers’
effort. This is because workers may compete for a higher position, and the firm can
promote—and thus award a higher status to—the worker who produces larger profits. To
see this, we can introduce a new stage of competition for promotion before the previous
game. In this new stage, two workers with identical status compete for promotion, and
the one who produces higher profit (or equivalently lower cost) wins the leading position
and is awarded a higher status in the next stage. Such an award gives him entitlement
to certain privileges, which lowers the leader’s cost in the next period. Worker 1 will
choose a > 3/4, since it improves his chance of winning the promotion and thereby
enjoying higher status as a leader in the next period, even though it lowers his first-
period payoff, while worker 2 will choose b < 1/4 for similar reasons. Increasing status
differentiation therefore negatively affects coordination. This is because the prospect of
promotion causes the two workers to focus on their own agenda to minimize costs rather
25
than improve coordination.
Second, status is only one of the many incentives provided in organizations. Another
important incentive contract is wages. However, the main tradeoffs remain unchanged
even if we consider wages (as shown in Section 3.3) because introducing wages only affects
the share of revenues between workers but does not affect the cost of action, e.g., priority
access to resources and the power of issuing orders, and hence it will not affect the anal-
ysis of status. However, other more sophisticated compensation schemes might improve
efficiency over the revenue-sharing schemes considered here. By assuming that actions
are unobservable (hence, noncontractible), this analysis abstracts from contracting prob-
lems. More generally, optimal contracts have been analyzed elsewhere (see Gibbons and
Roberts (2013) for a survey), yet no research has been done on the comparison of status
rewards and other incentive contracts. Thus, further work on this issue could be fruitful.
Finally, it would be interesting to consider the possibility of hiring a leader from
outside the firm instead of promoting a worker from within, which broadens the modes
of coordination from one (internal leader only) to two (internal vs. external leader).
In fact, there are advantages and disadvantages to recruiting internally or externally.
Whereas external recruitment brings fresh ideas to the firm, internal candidates know
the firm’s culture better and the firm knows the candidates’ abilities better. So, external




A Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting a∗ and b∗ into Equation (1), we obtain
V =
2f(s)f(−s)[1 + 2f(s) + 2f(−s)]
[f(s) + f(−s) + 2f(s)f(−s)]2 . (A.1)
When status affects workers’ costs of compromising in a symmetric way, we have f(s) +





which can be easily shown to be smaller than 5/8 for any x.
B Proof of Corollary 1
Let f(s) = 1− x and f(−s) = 1 + x. Then we have
a∗ − b∗ = 1− x
2
2− x2 .





Therefore, a∗ − b∗ is maximized at x = 0, i.e., when there is no status difference.
C Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating Equation (A.1) with respect to s, we have
∂V
∂s
|s=0 = −f ′(0+) + f ′(0−)
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Therefore, when status differentiation is limited (that is, s→ 0),
∂V
∂s
|s=0 > 0 if f ′(0+) < f ′(0−).
D Proof of Proposition 3
Given bl, the equilibrium actions are given by
a∗v =
f(s) + 2f(s)(s+ f(−s)) + sbl
f(s) + f(−s) + s+ 2f(s)(f(−s) + s) ,
b∗v =
f(s) + sbl(1 + 2f(s))
f(s) + f(−s) + s+ 2f(s)(f(−s) + s) .
Since a∗v|s=0 = 3/4 and b∗v|s=0 = 1/4, the impact of introducing a small status differential
on the value of the organization is as follows:
∂V
∂s


















Using b∗v = (1 + 2f(s))a
∗










so introducing a small status difference increases the organizational value if b′s > f
′(0+)/4,




Differentiating pil with respect to bl gives
∂pil
∂bl
= 0⇔ 2f(s)(1− a∗v)
∂a∗v
∂bl















⇔ b∗v = 1.




v = 1, which violates the follower’s
participation constraint, Equation (4). Therefore, the choice of bl is such that Equation
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v(s, bl)) = U.





























(f ′(0+)− f ′(0−))2 < f ′(0−)− 2f ′(0+).
E Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose now that bl ∈ [0, 1]. It is clear that the leader always want to recommend a larger
bl to the follower because ∂pil/∂bl > 0. Define b
∗








l )) = U .
If b∗l ≤ 1, then the analysis in Appendix D continues to hold. However, if b∗l > 1, then
the leader is constrained in his recommendation, and he is obliged to recommend bl = 1,
which leaves the follower a higher payoff than his outside option. Then, the value of the
organization is simply given by V (a∗v(s, 1), b
∗
v(s, 1)). It is straightforward to show that
(∂V/∂s)s=0 is positive if
f ′(0+) < f ′(0−) + 3,
which is again less stringent than Equation (2), irrespective of whether the high-status
worker has a higher or lower cost of compromising.
Then we derive the condition under which the constraint bl ≤ 1 is binding. Recall









l )) = U.
It can be written as
Ab2l −Bbl + C = 0,
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where
A = 2s[(1 + 2s)f 2(s) + f(−s)(s+ f(−s))(1 + 2f(s))2 + 2f(s)f(−s)(1 + 2f(s))],
B = 4sf 2(s)[1 + 2(s+ f(−s))],
C = 2f 2(s)(s+ f(−s))[1 + 2(s+ f(−s))]− [f(s) + (s+ f(−s)(1 + 2f(s)]2(1− 2U).
















Moreover, we have A′ → 32 and B′ → 12 as s→ 0, and
(B2 − 4AC)′ = 2BB′ − 4A′C − 4AC ′.
Thus, if lims→0C < 0, we have bl → +∞ as s→ 0. Indeed, we can show that lims→0C < 0
if U < 5/16, and lims→0C = 0 if U = 5/16. Therefore, bl ≤ 1 is binding if U < 5/16.




1− 24f+ + 8f−
16
,
and thus, bl ≤ 1 is binding if f− − 3f+ > 21. Furthermore, if f− − 3f+ < −1/8, there is
no bl satisfying the follower’s participation constraint, i.e., the follower obtains his outside
option in this case.
F Proof of Proposition 4






1− s) = 2,
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and
a = b = bl.
Since the disobedience cost is too high with large status differential, the follower will
choose b = bl. The leader will choose a = b, creating perfect coordination, because his
cost of compromising is very small.
The optimal bl is determined by the follower’s participation constraint:
1
2
− 2b2l = U.
Clearly, bl is decreasing in U , and bl = 1/2 if U = 0. Moreover, the value of the
organization, given by
V = 1− (1− bl)2 − b2l ,
is maximized at bl = 1/2 (i.e., when U = 0). Even if the follower’s outside option is zero,
the value of the organization with status differential, V = 1/2, is less than that without,
5/8. Thus, for any positive outside option, it is not optimal to differentiate workers.
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